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THE INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF A HOLDING OF
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXPATRIATION STATUTES
The author discusses the impact of recent Supreme Court
decisions and congressional statutes on the taxation of naturalized U.S. citizens not residing in the United States.
I. INTRODUCTION
As immigration has played such a prominent part in the development
of the United States, the problems of naturalization, rights of
citizenship, repatriation of former citizens, and expatriation, have been
given considerable attention. However, it was not until the decision of
Schneider v. Rusk' that attention was given to the tax consequences
connected with these problems. As a result of this decision, a large
group of persons believed to have been expatriated, found themselves
to be citizens of the United States. The problem therefore is the tax
effect of this action on these persons.
The Internal Revenue Service published in Revenue Ruling 70-506 its
interpretation of the income tax consequences of the Schneider
decision.2 The Service's position is that, as section 352 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act 3 was declared to be invalid by the
Supreme Court, the law was void ab initio; therefore, people affected
by the law are not now regaining their citizenship because they never
lost it. Thus, persons who derived none of the benefits of United States
citizenship, are nevertheless subject to the burdens of citizenship, i.e.
taxation. Therefore, a question of policy arises as to the equity of
taxing these persons during their period of "non-citizenship."
II. HISTORY OF THE SCHNEIDER v. RUSK DECISION
On May 18, 1964, the Supreme Court decided Schneider v. Rusk.4
Mrs. Schneider, who was born in Germany, acquired derivative United
States citizenship at the age of 16 through her mother, but later
returned to Germany, married a German national, and resided there for
I
2
3
4

Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
Rev. Rul. 70-506, 1970 INT. REv. BULL. No. 401 at 7.
Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 269.
377 U.S. 163 (1964).
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more than three years after her marriage. Her citizenship was declared
terminated by the State Department under paragraph (1) of section 352
(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. s This Act provides
that a naturalized citizen shall lose his citizenship by residing
continuously for three years in the foreign state of which he was
formerly a national or in which he was born. The Supreme Court held
that the statute was so unjustifiably discriminatory against naturalized
that it violated the due
citizens, as opposed to native born citizens,
6
process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
In addition to Schneider v. Rusk, there have been several other
decisions by the Supreme Court in recent years concerning expatriation." Though the Schneider case arose under section 352 (a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, all of the other cases arose
under section 349 of the 1952 Act s or its predecessor, section 401 of
the Nationality Act of 1940. 9
From 1958 to 1966 the Court increasingly manifested doubt as to
the constitutionality of statutes which expatriated citizens through the
mere doing of acts which per se allegedly showed diluted allegiance to
the United States. These decisions, in general, protected the citizen
from involuntary expatriation, but nowhere denied the inherent right
of voluntary expatriation.' 0 Congress, however, has traditionally
recognized an individual's right to renounce allegiance to any nation
and has given legal significance to such renunciation.' 1 Repudiating
altogether the concept of statutory involuntary expatriation, Afroyim
v. Rusk held that Congress had no power to take away an American's

5 Act of June

27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 269.
6 See Kurland, Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislativeand Executive Branches
of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 168 (1964).
7 See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Marks v. Esperdy, 377 U.S. 214 (1964).
8 McCarran-Walter Act, ch. 3, §349, 66 Stat. 268.
9 The Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1168-69.
10 Dual or multiple nationality is a status applicable to many citizens of the United States
as well as many citizens of other countries. Dual nationality results from the fact that there is
no uniform rule of international law relating to the acquisition or loss of nationality.
International law recognizes the right of each country to determine how its nationality may be
acquired or lost. Each country has its own laws on the subject and its nationality is conferred
upon individuals or divested on the basis of its own independent domestic policy. Individuals
may be clothed with more than one nationality not by preference on their part but by reason
of the operation of these different laws. It is extremely difficult to divest oneself of the
nationality of many countries by reason of those countries' laws on loss of nationality. In such
countries the voluntary acquisition of another nationality may not automatically result in the
loss of the nationality of the country of origin. See Dual or Multiple Nationality; Loss of
Nationality, 65 AM. J. INT'L. L. 187 (1971).
11 See Gordon, The Citizen and the State: Power of Congress to Expatriate American
Citizens, 53 GEO. L. J. 315 (1965);See Kramer, The Restraintsof Schneider v. Rusk Upon the
Foreign Policy, Powers of the "PoliticalBranches". How Meaningful Are They? 38 TEMP. L.
Q. 279 (1965); See Roche, The Expatriation Cases: "Breathes There The Man, With Soul So
Dead... ?" 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 325; See Maxey, Loss of Nationality: Individual Choice or
Government Fiat?,26 ALBANAY L. REV. 151 (1962).
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citizenship without his assent, and that he keeps it "unless he
1
voluntarily relinquishes it. 2
On April 5, 1971, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
the case of Rogers v. Belle.1 3 The appellee challenged the constitutionality of section 301 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, which provides that one who acquires United States citizenship
by virtue of having been born abroad to at least one parent who is an
American citizen and who has met certain residence requirements, shall
lose his citizenship unless he resides in this country continuously for
five years between the ages of 14 and 28.14 The three-judge district
court had held the section unconstitutional, citing Afroyim v. Rusk' 5
and Schneider v. Rusk. 6 The Supreme Court held that Congress has
the power to impose the condition subsequent of residence in this
country on the appellee, who does not come within the fourteenth
amendment's definition of citizens as those born or naturalized in the
United States, and its imposition is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unlawful. 17
III. INCOME TAX ISSUE RAISED
The income tax issue raised by the Schneider decision is that the tax
burden of a non-resident United States citizen in most cases is much
greater than that of a non-resident alien.' 8 A United States citizen is
subject to taxation on all of his income from all sources and is allowed
a credit for taxes paid to foreign countries on income from all sources
within those countries. 2 0 A non-resident alien not engaged in a trade or
business 2 1 in the United States is subject to taxation only on income
from sources within this country.2 2 Moreover, capital gains realized in
this country by a non-resident alien are not taxable at all unless the
alien spends more than a specified time in this country during any given
year.2 3 This freedom from tax applies even though the sale took place
in the United States, so that the income was of a United States source,
and it applies to the sale of United States real property as well as
12
13
14
Is
16
17
18

Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
Rogers v. Bellei, 91 S.Ct. 1060 z1971).
Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82414, 66 Stat. 269.
387 U.S. 253 (1967).
377 U.S. 163 (1964).
Rogers v. Bellei, 91 S.Ct. 1060 (1971).
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).

19 INT. REV..CODE OF 1954, §61.
20 I NT. REV. C ODE OF 1954,' §901.

21 Saunders, "Trade or Business,"Its Meaning Under the Internal Revenue Code, 1960 S.
CALIF. TAX INST. 693.

23 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §871 (a) (2). See Weyher & Keley, 111, Nonresident
Alien Individualsand The CapitalGains Tax, 1954 N. Y. U. TAX INST. 883.
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personal property.
Further, it may be said generally that the
principal effects of most tax treaties on a non-resident alien are to (1)
reduce the tax rate on, or entirely exempt, certain dividend and interest
income from United States sources; (2) exempt royalty income from
patents, copyrights, artistic works, etc., paid by United States sources;
(3) exempt a limited amount of compensation for personal services
rendered in the United States; and (4) provide for a tax credit where
income might otherwise be subjected to double taxation. 2 1 Consequently, the forcing of involuntary citizenship on persons who
reasonably believed that they were not citizens would work extreme
and unjust hardship taxwise.
IV. CITIZENSHIP ISSUES RAISED
Although the Supreme Court has clarified the law with respect to the
power of Congress to impose involuntary expatriation,2 6 the Court has
not ruled that a citizen's renunciation must be manifested in any
certain way. The cases have involved claims of citizenship, not claims of
non-citizenship; hence the Court has not been called upon to determine
2 7
what action is sufficient to constitute voluntary expatriation.
In a statute enacted in 1868,28 expatriation was acknowledged by
Congress to be a natural and inherent right of every person. This statute
is in full force and effect. In Savorgnan v. United States, the Supreme
Court stated:
Traditionally the United States has supported the right of
expatriation as a natural and inherent right of all people. Denial,
restriction, impairment or questioning of that right was declared
by Congress, in 1868, to be inconsistent with the fundamental
principles of this government. From the beginning, one of the
most obvious and effective forms of expatriation has been that
of naturalization under the laws of another nation. However,
due to the common-law prohibition of expatriation without the
24 Berens, United States Taxation of the American Income of Foreigners, 45 TAXES
830 (Dec. 1967).
25 Schneider, Aliens and the United States Income Tax-1956, 34 TAXES 583 (Sept.
1956).
26See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
27 The 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals on April 13, 1971, upheld a deportation order
against Thomas Glenn Jolley, ruling that he made himself an alien and must be regarded as
such. Jolley had appeared before the U.S. Consul in Toronto and formally executed an oath of
renunciation of U.S. citizenship. Jolley later returned to the United States and was arrested in
Georgia, March 19, 1969, for violation of U.S. Selective Service Laws. In opposing deportation,
Jolley argued that this renunciation was made under duress, with coercion being his desire to
avoid breaking the Selective Service Laws. The majority opinion said Jolley's renunciation was
the product of personal choice and consequently voluntary. Jolley v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 441 F. 2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1971).
28 Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223.
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consent of the sovereign, our courts hesitated to recognize
expatriation of our citizens, even by foreign naturalization,
without the express consent of our Government. Congress
finally gave its consent upon the specific terms stated in the
Citizenship Act of 1907 and in its successor, the Nationality
Act of 1940. Those Acts are to be read in the light of the
declaration of policy favoring freedom of expatriation which
stands unrepealed. 9
Subsequently, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952, which provided that a U. S. citizen may lose his citizenship in
a number of ways, including "by making a formal renunciation of
nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States
in a foreign state, in such form as may be prescribed by the Secretary of
State." 3 0
Against this background, two questions arise. The first is whether
Congress intended that citizenship could be relinquished only in one of
the ways prescribed in the statute, in particular, that citizenship could
only be renounced in the manner provided in paragraph (6) of section
349 (a). 3 The second question is whether, even if Congress so
intended, it could thus circumscribe the manner in which citizenship
can be relinquished. There is no certain answer to either of these
questions.
The position of the government that the taxpayer is a citizen rests
upon the erroneous constitutional doctrine that an unconstitutional
statute and all action taken under it are void. This constitutional
doctrine was rejected many years ago by the Supreme Court in the case
of Cbicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank. 3 2 The Supreme
Court held that the prior decree of the district was res judicata, saying:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the
Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional was
not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and
imposing no duties and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. 3 3 It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence
of a statute prior to such a determination is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to
29 Savorgnan v. U.S., 338 U.S. 491,497-98 (1950).
30 Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 83-414, 66 Stat. 269.
31 Id.
32 Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
33 Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886); Chicago, Indianapolis and Louisville
Railway Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559 (1913).
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be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular
relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct,
private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have
finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light
of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application,
demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts,
state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions
that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified ... .

In J. A. Dougherty's Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner3 5 the taxpayer
accrued and deducted from his gross income for 1935, 1936 and 1937,
a tax imposed by a statute of Pennsylvania. The taxpayer had reported
the taxes to the state, but had not paid them due to extensions of time
for payment. Before payment was made the Pennsylvania statute
imposing the taxes was held to be unconstitutional. The commissioner
of Internal Revenue then disallowed the accrual by the taxpayer of the
taxes for the years 1935, 1936, and 1937 on the grounds that there was
never any liability for the taxes because the statute was unconstitutional. The court of appeals rejected the government's decision holding
that the accruals were proper. It referred to the opinion in Cbicot
County DrainageDist. v. Baxter State Bank, and said:
Although it was formerly held that an unconstitutional
statute is a nullity ab initio, more lately it has been recognized
that the consequences of action taken or restricted in obedience
to the requirements of a statute which subsequently is declared
unconstitutional are to be appraised and adjusted in light of the
compulsion exerted by the statute prior to its determined
invalidity. 3 6
Thus, the decision in the Schneider case did not retroactively wipe
section 352 (a) 37 off the statute books, nor did it undo the actions
taken by the State Department under it prior to that decision. Persons
whose citizenship was terminated under section 352 (a) had to make
which were necessary or desirable because
adjustments in their affairs
39
of their loss of citizenship.
To treat the decision in the Schneider case as having the effect of
establishing unbroken continuity of citizenship for all persons to whom
section 352 (a) 4 0 had been applied is to ignore the facts. Considering
34
35
36
37

Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
J. A. Dougherty's Sons v. Comm'r., 121 F. 2d 700 (3rd Cir. 1941).
Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 269.
38 Id.

39 See § 3 infra.

40 Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 269.
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such circumstances, the most that Schneider could do was to restore
citizenship to those who wanted it. Moreover, to force such restoration
upon all persons, completely disregards their wishes. If, because of a
narrow view of the effect of an unconstitutional statute, restoration of
citizenship is to be imposed upon an unwilling person, the result would
be arbitrary and unjust.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE APPROACH
One solution to the taxpayers' predicament is for appropriate relief
to be granted through legislation by Congress. However, only the
possibilities of administrative relief will be discussed here. The Internal
Revenue Service could have declared shortly after the opinion in the
Schneider case was handed down, that no tax would be asserted against
persons entitled to the protection of the Schneider decision who had
not claimed citizenship or the benefits thereof. Such administrative
relief would have depended on the Service's recognition that persons
who have not taken advantage of the Schneider decision should not be
taxed as citizens. Such a policy would be in keeping with the view of
the Supreme Court expressed in Cbicot County DrainageDist. v. Baxter
State Bank.4 1 The argument which may be raised, however, is that
persons entitled to citizenship under the decision in Schneider may
claim citizenship in the future, and that unless they are taxed
immediately for years subsequent to that decision, they could possibly
avoid income taxes which they rightfully owe. This would not be the
case unless a person is taxed for all years subsequent to the Schneider
decision, whether or not he has claimed citizenship under that decision.
If the more reasonable position is taken that only those who have
claimed citizenship under the protection of the decision should be
taxed as citizens, then it could be said that if any such person should
claim citizenship in the future and takes advantage of his rights flowing
from Schneider, he should be taxed for all years subsequent to that
decision.
The case of Rexacb v. United States supports this position.4 2 In that
case a native born Puerto Rican, who was a United States citizen, left
Puerto Rico in 1944 and became a resident of the Dominican Republic,
remaining there until 1961. In July, 1958, he executed a written
renunciation of American citizenship before a United States consular
official in the statutory form, and a certificate of loss of nationality was
approved by the State Department. On July 26, 1958, the taxpayer was
41 Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940). See Labor
Board v. Rockaway News Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
42 Rexach v. U.S., 390 F. 2d 631 (1st Cir. 1969).
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declared to be a citizen of the Dominican Republic. In 1961, the
taxpayer applied for an American passport, claiming that his renunciation in 1958 was not voluntary, that he had been coerced into making
it by economic pressure and physical threats. The court agreed with the
Internal Revenue Service, holding the taxpayer liable as a citizen for tax
purposes during the interim period. Based upon the taxpayer's
reasoning, this would appear to be a correct result. The taxpayer
claimed that his renunciation was invalid because it was involuntary;
that he never lost his citizenship; and that he was a citizen for the entire
period. Thus, he could not claim citizenship for the entire period of
time for purposes of benefits, such as the right to a United States
passport, and then deny citizenship to escape its burdens, such as taxes.
In like manner, whenever a person claims citizenship under the
Schneider decision, no matter how much time has elapsed after that
decision, he is in effect claiming that he has been a citizen from the
moment of that decision and if he has been a citizen, he must then pay
taxes as a citizen for all of the years subsequent to that decision.
Furthermore, there would be no bar to the assessment and collection of
taxes for all of those years in that such a person would not have filed
returns as a citizen for the years subsequent to the Schneider
decision.4 3 Through this method, the revenue of the United States
government would be fairly protected. However, this result is not
entirely equitable, since, for those persons who affirm their United
States citizenship, they are liable for the imposition of income tax
during all of the intervening years of "noncitizenship." It may be
recalled that one of the cries of the founders of this country was "no
taxation without representation." Not only did these persons not have
respresentation, but it is probable that some or all of them were denied
access to this country during this period. The question is then raised as
to the equity of taxing these persons during the period of time in which
the United States government denied to them the benefits of
citizenship.
Further consideration may be given to the case where although the
individual has technically complied with the nationality requirements
of another country, it is obvious on its face that this was done through
tax motivations. This problem may be more difficult if the person
resided in certain foreign countries which have no requirement beyond
a certain period of residence to create citizenship in that country.4 4
Here, the person would have to make no formal declaration of
allegiance or sign other papers to constitute himself a citizen of that
43 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6501 (c)(3).

44 Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act of 1956, Acts of the Oireachtas 439,447, par. 14,
15 (Ire). See Law of Return No. 5710 (1950), 8 Laws of the State of Israel 114, as amended, 8
Laws of the State of Israel 144 (1954).

1971]

Tax Consequences of Expatriation
country. In this type of situation, a person may have had access and/or
received the benefits of United States citizenship without its burdens as
well as receiving the benefits of another country's citizenship.
In these cases of dual or multiple nationality, the holding of the
International Court of Justice in the Notebobm case should be closely
scrutinized. 4
Here, the court discussed those factors which it
considered to constitute real and effective nationality. Among these the
court mentioned:
The habitual residence of the individual concerned is an
important factor, but there are other factors such as the center
of his interest, his family ties, his participation in public life,
attachment shown 4by
him for the given country and inculcated
6
in his children, etc.
Where the individual concerned claims that he has had little real or
substantive contact with one particular country, this may negate his
assertion that he had the intent to become a citizen of that country. On
the other hand, Where the person can show these factors, the argument
that he retained United States citizenship and did not acquire the
citizenship of the foreign country would appear to be very weak.
Of the many possibilities available to the government to provide
relief to those persons who were affected by the Scbneider decision, the
Internal Revenue Service chose to publish a Revenue Ruling in 1970,
holding as follows:
As a result of Schneider v. Rusk any Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States issued by reason of section
352(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 is
considered null and void and the individual affected thereby is a
citizen of the United States and taxable under section 1 or
section 1201 (b) of the Code on income received from sources
within and with the United States .... Accordingly, A is a
citizen of the United States and is taxable under section 1 or
section 1201 (b) of the Code on income from sources both
within and without the United States .... Pursuant to the
authority granted by section 7805 (b) of the Code, this
Revenue Ruling will not be applied for taxable years beginning
prior to January 1, 1971, unless, under the applicable facts, the
taxpayer is a citizen of the United States without regard to the
Scbneider decision. For taxable years beginning prior to
January 1, 1971, an individual to whom the Scbneider decision
applies and to whom this Revenue Ruling is not applied is
subject to tax as a nonresident alien.
Furthermore, the mere fact that an individual affected by
the Scbneider decision and this Revenue Ruling takes affirmative steps before January 1, 1971 to establish noncitizen status,
4S Nottebohm Case, 119551 1. C. J. 4.
46 Id.
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will not be considered evidence of a tax avoidance motive for
purposes of section 877 of the Code. 4 7
VI. CONCLUSION
The Schneider decision handed down in 1964 was a far-reaching
decision; it affected thousands of persons around the world, and the tax
consequences for persons affected were unclear. The most obvious way
in which these consequences could have been clarified would have been
through a published and publicized announcement in 1964, not in
1970, of the Internal Revenue Service's position. Such an announcement was called for and would have been in conformity with the
Service's policy of notification to taxpayers of tax liability. For this
reason, the Internal Revenue Service, by failing in 1964 to publish a
clarifying Revenue Ruling as to the tax effect of Schneider v. Rusk,
failed in its obligation to furnish needed guidance to taxpayers in order
that they might not be misled to their detriment. The Revenue Ruling
which the Internal Revenue Service published in 1970 is unclear as to
whether only those individuals affected by the Schneider decision are
to be affected by the Ruling. No mention is made of those citizens
affected by the Afroyim v. Rusk decision. The Revenue Ruling should
have made it clear that it would cover all persons expatriated by
operation of any statute now held to be, or administratively deemed to
be, unconstitutional. Further, the Revenue Ruling makes it mandatory
under section 7805 (b) for all individuals involved to be taxed as
nonresident aliens; although the Revenue Ruling holds that individuals
under Schneider are citizens, the application of section 7805 (b) makes
it mandatory that they be taxed as nonresident aliens prior to 1971.
Section 7805 (b) is not here being applied as the relief provision it is
intended to be. Such taxpayers should be allowed the choice to be
taxed either as citizens or as non-resident aliens prior to 1971. In
voluntarily electing to regain citizenship retroactively (the Schneider
decision, after all, was intended as a protection, not a burden), they
would also be liable for United States taxes as citizens, retroactively.
Such would be the individual's election and the only fair method
available under the circumstances.

47 Rev. Rul. 70-506, 1970 INT. REV. BULL. No. 40, at 7.

